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Abstract
Purpose: The maritime shipping industry is an alluring subject for legislative impact studies. It 
is particularly well placed to avoid legislation due to its international nature, relocatable assets, 
and challenging enforcement of rules. Increased political measures to protect the marine 
environment meet aaddress a shippingn industry characterized by a decade of strained financial 
resources, excess supply of capacity, and consolidation.. Noncompliance with environmental 
rules is one path companies might take to stay competitive within their industry and vis-à-vis 
other transport modes. Around 5-15% of industry participants are believed by shipping experts 
to neglect rules on vessel-source pollution intentionally or unintentionallyto stay competitive 
within their industry and vis à vis other transport modes. The objective of this This study aimsis 
to identify and quantify cost effects of maritime environmental legislation, to relate these with 
company characteristics like company size, average vessel age, or area of operations, and to 
investigate the impact of regulatory compliance. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: A mixed methods design was employed to develop both a 
theoretical model of compliance costs effects and to quantify the effect sizes of determinants 
identified. In a first step, tTwelve in-depths exploratory expert interviews were conducted with 
key stakeholders within the shipping industry and analysed by way of qualitative content 
analysis. A theoretical framework emerged that was evaluated, strengthened and fed with 
quantitative data from questionnaire data by 120 shipping companies active in the North and 
Baltic Sea area. Partial least squares analysis was conducted to determine compliance cost 
effects for different types of shipping companies.
Findings: It was found that organizational capacities played a significant role in determining 
compliance behaviour, particularly the availability of capable, dedicated personnel with good 
contacts across the industry, as well as the membership in an industry association. Exterior 
determinants like enforcement and controls, individual motivations of key personnel and 
company characteristics like size and vessel age showed no significant correlation with legal 
compliance. This is a striking result, as it shows that results of empirical research dodoes not 
support classic economic theory of achieving legal compliance with a strong enforcement of 
rulesmeasures of strong enforcement. 
Social implications: European transport policy making depends on scientifically sound studies 
on the impact of policy on different transport sectors. An in-depth impact assessment on 
environmental legislation for the maritime industry , with the specific focus on company 
characteristics, does not only provide insights into this specific industry, but highlights 
mechanisms applicable to environmental policy making in other transport sectors and helps in 
building a transport policy that takes into accountconsiders compliance concerns, company 
characteristics and the interconnectedness of different transport modes - for a sound response 
to the tragedy of the commons.
Originality/ value: OThe originality of this research lies in the inductive development of a 
comprehensive theory on shipping companies’ legal compliance behaviour as well as the 
empirical testing of this theory. , making use of partial least squares analysis. A valuable result 
lies in the finding that organizational capacities play a much larger role for abiding by 
environmental rules than an effective system of enforcement. Further value is derived from 
applying a sequential mixed methods approach to the research problem, showing both the worth 
and challenge in combining different methodologies to achieve sound research results. 
Keywords—regulatory compliance, compliance costs, marine environmental protection, mixed 
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methods research, clean vessel operations, North and Baltic Sea area.
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Introduction
This paper studies the impact of legal compliance on compliance costs with maritime 
environmental legislation as part of a more comprehensive research project on compliance cost 
effects. The commercial shipping industry is characterized by increased possibilities to avoid 
regulation via moving assets that may easily be relocated to other jurisdictions, varying levels 
of enforcement of international rules in port states, global commons in the form of international 
waters where enforcement is hardly possible, at times colliding interests between flag and port 
states as regards environmental protection and offering low-cost solutions to shippers and, 
according to Tan, ‘a generally secretive and fragmented nature’. (Tan, 2006, p.6)(Tan 2006, 6) 
Regulatory avoidance and free-riding are inherent to the sector, a recent OECD report argues. 
(OECD, 2014, p.86)(OECD 2014, 86) This international, hard-to-regulate-or-control industry 
is increasingly faced with legislative endeavours to protect the marine environment, particularly 
in specially protected areas, like the North and Baltic Sea. If shipping companies’ decisions are 
based on cost-benefit considerations, it is likely that incentives to violate cost-incurring 
environmental rules will increase with cost pressure. 
The researchers br efly discuss advances in maritime environmental legislation and their 
cost effects, the concept of regulatory compliance, and the associated rational choice approach. 
A model of compliance determinants developed inductively from qualitative data analysis and 
a review of prior studies is presented. A concise presentation of the methodology applied is 
ensued by a discussion of results of the quantitative study, involving partial least squares 
analysis of questionnaire data. Statistical results are discussed and compared with theoretical 
concepts. The present study serves to enhance knowledge of compliance behaviour and 
contributes to a fit-for-purpose assessment of existing and future maritime environmental 
legislation. 
Novelty of this study stems from both the theoretical model of compliance determinants 
and empirical testing of the model. The path model is based on literature review – leading to a 
comprehensive sketch of compliance drivers specifically focused on the shipping industry – as 
well as knowledge gained from 12 in-depth expert interviews to enrich and refine that model. 
Empirical testing is done with data from 120 questionnaires distributed to owners and operators 
of commercial vessels in the North and Baltic Sea area. This research is relevant in providing a 
consolidated, consequentially organized model of determinants of compliance for the shipping 
industry based on prior studies, qualitative content analysis of primary interview data and 
statistical analysis of primary questionnaire data. Special considerations applicable to the 
shipping industry are explored and the model developed stands as a first to empirically test 
determinants of compliance behaviour with maritime environmental legislation.
Maritime environmental legislation in the North and Baltic Sea area 
Environmental legislation to protect sea areas from harmful vessel-source emissions has 
received increased political attention in recent years. With the aim of fostering cleaner ship 
operations, stricter legislation has been passed on the national and international level. Rules on 
sulphur and nitrogen oxide emissions, the introduction of invasive alien species through ballast 
water and other sources of pollution are currently being phased in or will soon come into force 
in the North and Baltic Sea area. Examples of such rules sorted by type of pollution are listed 
in Table 1. The law demands that measures must show positive effects, e.g. on the health of the 
marine environment and society, in excess of potential negative economic and social effects, 
e.g. in the form of more expensive transport services. (Marine Strategy Framework Directive, 
Art. 8). Compliance may lead to more efficient operations. It is however prone to increase costs 
to industry, thus raising the likelihood of deviant behaviour.
Oily water Applicable from 2002/2004/2005
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(Prohibition of all operational discharges 
of oil)
(IMO, 1973, MEPC, 2002, 2004, 2005)(IMO 
1973; MEPC 2002; MEPC 2004; MEPC 2005)
Garbage
(Prohibition of all operational discharges 
of garbage)
Applicable from 2000
(MEPC, 1991, European Parliament and 
European Council, 2000, MEPC, 2013a)(MEPC 
2013a; MEPC 1991; European Parliament and 
European Council 2000)
Hull coatings
(Prohibition of all hull coatings 
containing TBT)
Applicable from 2008
(IMO, 2008)(IMO 2008)
Air pollution I (Limitation of the amount 
of sulphur in fuel to 0.1%)
Applicable from 1 January 2015 (IMO, 
2005)(IMO 2005)
Air pollution II
(Mandatory energy-efficient operations 
lowering CO2 emissions)
Applicable from 2019 
(MEPC, 2013b)(MEPC 2013b)
Air pollution III
(Mandatory nitrogen oxide tier III 
requirements)
Applicable for new-buildings from 2021 
(MEPC, 2015)(MEPC 2015)
Sewage water
(Prohibition of all discharges)
Applicable from 1 June 2019 for new vessels 
and 2 June 2021 for existing vessels 
(MEPC, 2011)(MEPC 2011)
Ballast water
(Mandatory management systems)
Applicable from 8 September 2017 
(IMO, 2017)(IMO 2017)
Table 1. Examples of maritime legislation by type of pollution applicable on the North and 
Baltic Sea (Authors)
Costs of compliance with maritime environmental legislation 
Estimated cost effects of maritime environmental legislation for vessel operations on the North 
and Baltic Sea stem from literature review and questionnaire data. Prior studies considering the 
combined cost effect of several environmental legal rules are difficult to come by. One study 
that accumulates costs of several measures was conducted by the OECD in 2003. Researchers 
estimated compliance costs at the time to reach around 3.5% to 6.5% of a ship’s operating costs. 
(OECD, 2003, p.5)(OECD 2003, 5) Scorpecci estimates that compliance costs in 2004 reached 
up to 20% of the vessel’s revenue. He argues that with additional legislative measures, 
compliance costs will likely increase by 1.5 up to 3 times the amount of 2004 thus increasing 
the incentive for noncompliance. (Scorpecci, 2004, p.7)(Scorpecci 2004, 7) As these studies are 
quite dated, results may no longer be applicable. More recent studies usually consider a single 
legal endeavour. Several studies could be identified presenting cost estimates for compliance 
with stricter sulphur levels. Sampson et al. argue that the cost of compliance lies in the price 
differential between full compliance and non-compliance with legislation. (Sampson et al., 
2016, p.300)(Sampson et al. 2016, 300) Bell et al. discuss several categories of noncompliance 
costs, namely criminal liabilities (with rising fines and a rising willingness of regulatory 
agencies to prosecute), administrative sanctions (including suspension of licenses), clean-up 
costs (after pollution incidences; often exceeding the fines), civil liabilities (rather unlikely in 
the case of shipping), and adverse publicity. (Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen, 2013, p.39 et 
sqq.) The costs of noncompliance have been increasing in recent years, particularly driven by 
higher fines, increased controls, and a wider array of rules to follow. Taking sulphur legislation 
as an example, the costs of compliance are represented in the price difference between operating 
on distillate fuel and or operating on high sulphur fuel or the write-down for a scrubber 
investmentand risking sanctions. The price of noncompliance may thus be defined as the level 
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of damages from formal and informal institutions multiplied by the risk of detection. Depending 
on study design, total vessel operation costs in North and Baltic sea are estimated to increase by 6% to 
40% with the introduction of the sulphur emission control area (COMPASS, 2010, Notteboom, Delhay 
and Vanherle, 2010)(COMPASS 2010; Notteboom, Delhay, and Vanherle 2010), indicating that the 
costs of a single measure may significantly exceed the old dated OECD estimates. Studies on cost effects 
of NOx tier III requirements foresee additional increases of 0.6% to 2.5% (COMPASS, 
2010)(COMPASS 2010) or 6,500 to 400,000 EUR per vessel. (EPA, 2012)(EPA 2012) Installation costs 
for a ballast water treatment system are given at 100.000 to 1 million USD plus operating costs of 0.01 
to 0.2 USD per ton of ballast water treated, depending on vessel size. (GEF-UNDP-IMO GloBallast 
Partnerships Programme and IUCN, 2010)(GEF-UNDP-IMO GloBallast Partnerships Programme and 
IUCN, 2010) As study designs differ, these costs may not be aggregated, but the approximate range of 
compliance costs becomes evident. Other environmental rules are likely to be less costly, but add further 
pressure on an industry characterized by overcapacities. (Morley, 2016)(Morley 2016) The 2003 OECD 
study calculated possible savings of up to $400,000 a year for a noncompliant vessel compared to a fully 
compliant one. (OECD, 2003, p.5)(OECD 2003, 5) With new maritime environmental rules becoming 
effective in the next years, behaviour formerly not unlawful will be subjected to fines, increasing the 
risk of noncompliant behaviour. 
Cost accounting data collected through Primary questionnaires data suggests that while 
total costs stayed roughly the same between 2015 and 2017 for 36.2% companies, they 
increased for 56.5% of companies, with the largest group noticing an increase of some 5-10%. 
Voyage costs have behaved similarly in 2015-2017, with some 9% of companies even noticing 
a decrease and the majority experiencing slight increases in voyage costs. With a view to the 
future however, voyage costs are expected by most shipping companies to increase by some 5-
20% until 2022. (see graph 1, n=69) These figures may be explained by low fuel prices in the 
period since 2015, which alleviated effects of price increases due to low sulphur legislation, 
while at the same time future expectations for fuel prices are leading to anticipated rising bills. 
Among other considerations, the certainty of phased-in environmental legislation may also play 
a role in this expected increase. 
With respect to individual measures, graph 2 (n=47) shows results of a ranking by most 
expensive measure, indicating clearly that air pollution legislation (specifically measures to 
curb SO2 and NOx emissions), ballast water legislation and legislation on the reduction of CO2 
emissions are deemed the most expensive by the industry, while legislation on noise pollution 
is deemed the least expensive (which makes sense as there are of yet no measures in place), 
followed by antifouling legislation. A ranking on cost expectations for the years until 2022 (see 
graph 34, n=35) shows that the costs of ballast water legislation are expected to surpass the 
costs of air pollution legislation. An increased importance of measures on CO2 reduction 
between 2017 and 2022 may also be conjured from the graphsgraphs 2 and 3. Interestingly, 
despite its effect on costs, legislative compliance seems no significant determinant of freight 
rates for shipping companies. Other factors, like changes in the demand for transport capacity, 
changes in fuel costs irrespective of environmental legislation, and changes in cargo-handling 
costs, are having a greater influence on costs and prices of shipping companies than 
environmental legislation. This becomes apparent from graph 4 presenting a ranking of factors 
by their influence on freight rates.
Graphs 1-4: Total cost development and voyage cost development (2015-2022), Ranking by most 
expensive legislative measure (2015-2022), Ranking of cost factors by influence on freight rates 
(2015-2018) (Author)
Costs of noncompliance
Following rational choice theory, a shipping company will weigh the costs of compliance 
against the costs of noncompliance. Bell et al. discuss several categories of noncompliance 
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costs, namely criminal liabilities (with rising fines and a rising willingness of regulatory 
agencies to prosecute), administrative sanctions (including suspension of licenses), clean-up 
costs (after pollution incidences; often exceeding the fines), civil liabilities (rather unlikely in 
the case of shipping), and adverse publicity. (Bell, McGillivray, and Pedersen 2013, 39 et sqq.) 
It may be argued that the costs of noncompliance have been increasing in recent years, 
particularly driven by higher fines, increased controls, and a wider array of rules to follow.
Regulatory compliance 
Definition of regulatory compliance
The concept of regulatory compliance applied here follows a letter of the law approach as 
dissociated from behavioural definitions used in the social sciences and is defined as the 
conformity of an organization’s behaviour with a prescribed legal rule. (Mitchell, 1994, 
p.30)(Mitchell 1994, 30) Noncompliance is thus a deviation from prescribed legal behaviour. 
To evaluateIf one wants to measure all cost effects of legislation, however, changes of 
behaviour within the organization leading to cost increases need to be considered, even if they 
do not lead to a fully compliant organization. Recently researchers have suggested replacing 
the concept of regulatory compliance with the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
(Snezhko and Coskun, 2019) This approach seems insufficient to study the behavioural effect 
of legislation. Ethical considerations may induce a company to do more or less than legally 
prescribed. CSR may thus influence regulatory compliance, but a compliance decision will 
depend on more than ethics, as described below. Current research is also conducted on 
contractarian environmental legislation, where regulators refrain from enforcing certain laws in 
exchange for an organization’s commitment to fulfil obligations not required by law. A 
thorough discussion of this decentralized approach to policy-making can be found with Dana. 
(Dana, 2018) It currently finds no application in the area of maritime environmental legislation 
and is thus not further discussed here. Raustiala and Slaughter provide a helpful definition 
stating that at its roots compliance is a concept of causality looking at the behavioural influences 
of legal rules. (Raustiala and Slaughter, 2002, p.539)(Raustiala and Slaughter 2002, 539) 
Behaviour is relevant to the present research if it is directly or indirectly induced by maritime 
environmental legislation and leads to costs in terms of money, time, or other resources. Where 
legislation has no effect on costs it can be assumed that incentives for noncompliance are nil. 
Compliance and rational choice
Following a law and economics approach, this work links regulatory compliance to rational 
choice theory. The principle of compliance as a cost-benefit calculation has been described in 
a fundamental work on the economics of crime by Becker and defined further by his student 
Ehrlich. (Becker 1968; Ehrlich 1996) Applying a related definition by Posner, shipping 
companies are likely to ‘economize by buying less of a good or commodity when its price rises’ 
(Posner, 1974, p.763)(Posner 1974, 763), specifically they are likely to invest less in compliant 
behaviour if compliance becomes costlier, assuming that costs of noncompliance stay the same. 
Rational choice theory applies irrespective of whether compliance occurs willingly or 
unwillingly, termed ‘committed compliance’ and ‘capitulative compliance’ by McBarnet. 
(McBarnet, 2019) As stated above however, costs of noncompliance may be increasing 
simultaneously. Simpson and Rorie present compliance behaviour as a rational choice of 
companies between several alternatives. Noncompliance thus occurs where the benefits of 
unlawful behaviour outweigh the costs of compliance. (Simpson and Rorie, 2011, p.60 et 
sqq.)(Simpson and Rorie 2011, 60 et sqq.) Costs in this respect depend on preferences of 
individual decision-makers, as the value of morality, for example, differs between individuals. 
In this context it needs to be noted that non-compliance may both be a product of action or 
inaction. (Cohen and Simpson, 1997)(M. A. Cohen and Simpson 1997) When applying rational 
choice theory to compliance, limits to rationality need to be considered, like a lack of access to 
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information, individual characteristics of companies, and circumstances. Simpson and Rorie 
thus propose an objective utility approach signifying that costs and benefits are ‘perceptual, 
rather than objective’. (Simpson and Rorie, 2011, p.61)(Simpson and Rorie 2011, 61) Perceived 
costs and benefits of a certain legislative endeavour may differ between companies and may 
lead to dissociated behavioural outcomes. Rational choice theory tells us that shipping 
companies’ incentives to violate the rules are likely to increase with augmented cost pressure. 
Environmental pollution being an externality, companies would generally only take their 
individual costs, not the costs to society, into consideration. (Phaneuf and Requate, 2017, 
p.5)(Phaneuf and Requate 2017, 5)
Practical relevance of noncompliance with maritime environmental legislation
Studies on environmental compliance exist for organizations in general (i.e. writings on 
corporate crime), but are very rare for the commercial shipping industry, with the exclusion of 
fisheries, where the study of overfishing has received increased attention. This research gap 
may be due to the hard-to-grasp characteristics of the industry discussed above. A rare 
exception is the above-mentioned 2003 OECD report, estimating that around 10-15% of the 
world fleet is operated ‘in full contravention to the IMO’s body of environmental regulations’. 
(OECD, 2003, p.4)(OECD 2003, 4). These numbers may in the meantime have become 
outdated and the report provides no distinction between different company sizes, flag states, 
areas of operation or other, but gives a vague indication that noncompliance with maritime 
environmental legislation may be of relevance. Further evidence on the practical relevance of 
noncompliance stems from the annual reports of the Paris MoU on Port State Control. The 2016 
report shows that pollution is the number three reason for detention of vessels in European 
harbours. Noncompliance is regularly found with respect to rules on oily water (1.7% of 
deficiencies), sewage water (0.8%), garbage (1.3%) and air pollution (1.0%), while unlawful 
anti-fouling coatings are only detected in a negligible number of cases. (Paris MoU, 2017, 
p.48)(Paris MoU 2017, 48) Ballast water systems do not yet figure in the 2016 report, as they 
only became mandatory in September 2017. As port state control officers mostly control vessels 
particularly suspicious of noncompliance, i.e. black-listed vessels, these numbers provide 
limited evidence on the overall level of compliance with environmental legislation within the 
shipping industry. Data on compliance behaviour has been measured via questionnaires to build 
a compliance indicator as described below.
Mixed methods study
Method of the study
The present study is exploratory in nature. A mixed methods approach was chosen to facilitate 
the generation and testing of an original theoretical framework to investigate the research 
problem. Twelve in-depth expert interviews of 60 to 120 minutes length have been conducted 
by the researchers in 2015 and 2016 to identify drivers of environmental compliance, enhance 
the depth of knowledge on existing determinants and highlight cases of variable 
interdependency. Experts were purposefully sampled based on their superior knowledge on 
issues of maritime environmental legislation. Data acquired was fully transcribed, anonymized 
and translated into English where necessary. Guidance questions were related to the shipping 
companies’ level of knowledge and understanding about environmental legislation, their 
motivations to comply, as well as the effectiveness of control systems and technical compliance 
options. A theoretical framework was built to serve as a basis for the quantitative 
studyconfirmatory quantitative analysis. A 12-page-long, 129-item self-completion 
questionnaire was drafted and distributed via personalized email to commercial shipping 
companies with offices in countries bordering the North and Baltic Sea. From a full sample of 
829 companies,Of 149 questionnaires were received and, 121 met basic criteria to be used for 
evaluation. 
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Data analysis was conducted using SPSS, Excel and SmartPLS3. Multivariate analysis 
tools were chosen to test complex relationships between compliance variables. Partial-least 
squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) is applied here, which is both able to explore 
patterns in the data and test the a priori established theories as laid down in the theoretical 
framework.
Theoretical framework
The development of the theoretical framework from qualitative content analysis and systematic 
review of prior studies as presented in Graph 5 is described in detail in a working paper by 
Freese and Gille, available on Researchgate (Freese and Gille, 2017)(Freese and Gille 2017), 
and will not be detailed here. It suffices to point out that 13 determinants were inductively 
developed, which were clustered under three theoretical concepts, namely individual 
motivations, organizational capacities and exterior determinants. Items in the questionnaire 
relate to these theoretical concepts and data on proxy variables is collected to evaluate the 
statistical significance of theoretical relations.  
Graph 5. Theoretical framework of determinants of compliance based on exploratory qualitative 
study and literature review (Authors)
Path model with latent variables
A path model developed based on the theoretical framework can be found in Figure 6. Path 
models are widely applied to visualize variable relationships and hypotheses in SEM. (Hair, 
Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011)(Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt 2011) Both measurement theory and 
structural theory are shown in the graph. In this context, a formative measurement model is 
applied to identify drivers of compliance. Multi-item scales are used to increase predictive 
validity in line with recommendations by Diamantopoulos et al.  (Diamantopoulos et al., 
2012)(Diamantopoulos et al. 2012) Cronbach’s Alpha was employed to determine reliable proxy 
variables. Indicators were eliminated until Cronbach’s Alpha exceeded 0.6, leading to the 
exclusion of some measurements. ‘Individual motivations’ eventually relies on five indicators 
with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.733, ‘Organizational capacities’ relies on four indicators with a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.638, and ‘Exterior determinants’ relies on four indicators with a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.601. The researchers refrain from regression analysis based on sum 
scores (i.e. determining latent variable scores from average values of indicators) for the 
concepts, as it cannot be assumed that indicator weights are equal. Instead, partial least squares 
is employed as described below. 
Graph 6. Path model (Structural and measurement model) (Authors)
Measures
Determinants of compliance were identified from literature research and expert interviews. 
Many of the drivers constitute complex concepts that are defined here as latent or unobservable 
variables. These constructs may not be directly measured but must be studied indirectly by 
using indicators. Proxy variables were created and combined to form a single composite score. 
Measurement error from poorly worded questions or misunderstandings was aimed to be 
reduced by using several items to measure a concept. While the compliance index was 
computed from 5-point Likert scales, data on compliance attitudes was measured on 4-point 
Likert scales, not allowing for a “middle option”, but forcing a taking of sides. Likert items of 
all scales were symmetric around a middle item and equidistant and could thus be used in SEM. 
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(Hair, Jr. et al., 2018, p.9)(Hair, Jr. et al. 2018, 9) Control variables included were company size, 
area of operations, average vessel age and type of operations.
Missing data
The sample consists of 121 commercial shipping companies active at least betimes at times in 
the specially protected areas of the North and Baltic Sea. As data on compliance behaviour is 
particularly sensitive however, a limited number of companies participating in the study have 
provided answers to all questions on compliance. Constructs are based on a minimum of 36 
companies providing data. Companies having provided information on less than 85% of 
indicators were deleted from the sample for the purpose of this analysis, leaving 43 companies 
in the dataset. Following the 10-times rule by Barclay et al., sample size should equal at least 
10 times the largest number of structural paths directed at a particular construct in the structural 
model. (Barclay, Thompson, and Higgins 1995) As becomes apparent from the path model, latent 
variables are built upon five indicators at most, making n=43 a barely acceptable number. 
Results of the study thus need to be treated with great care, as the rough guideline provided by 
Barclay et al. for minimum sample size is not met. Hair et al. suggest however to deviate from 
this rough guideline using means of power analysis on the part of the model with the largest 
number of predictors as an indicator for minimum sample size. (Hair, Jr. et al., 2018, p.24)(Hair, 
Jr. et al. 2018, 24) Following calculations by Cohen, with the maximum number of independent 
variables being five, 37 observations would be needed to achieve a statistical power of 80% for 
detecting R² values of at least 0.25 (with a 10% probability of error). (Cohen, 1992)(J. Cohen 
1992) The sample size is thus deemed acceptable in the light of this being a study on a sensitive 
topic in a seclusive industry.
Missing data is dealt with in two different ways. Mean value replacement is applied if 
less than 5% of values are missing for an indicator. Other missing data is dealt with by pairwise 
deletion. Although this might lead to biased r sults based on different sample sizes per 
indicator, it seems the best choice in light of the data’s many missing values. In these cases, 
mean value replacement would lead to a decrease in variability and thus explanatory power of 
the data and casewise deletion would further shrink the already small dataset.
Data analysis
Partial least squares (PLS) was chosen as a modelling technique, as it proves apt to deal with 
specific challenges of the data at hand. PLS consists of a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
analyses and is a two-stage technique where first the outer model is evaluated in terms of 
reliability and validity and then the inner model is assessed. This structural equation modelling 
technique is able to handle small sample sizes, has minimal demand on measurement scales, 
can deal with violations of the normality distribution assumption and is robust with respect to 
multicollinearity. (Wold et al., 1984)(Wold et al. 1984) It also treats proxy variables as 
approximations of the constructs they replace, which is very fitting in this study, and makes it 
a superior method to CB-SEM for the study at hand. (Hair, Jr. et al., 2018, p.16)(Hair, Jr. et al. 
2018, 16) PLS may both be used to test theories and find relationships between variables. It may 
be distinguished from more traditional methods of data analysis such as multiple regression in 
being able to analyse both manifest and latent variables alike. Unobservable variables may thus 
be measured indirectly. (Hair, Jr. et al., 2018, p.3)(Hair, Jr. et al. 2018, 3) Measurement errors in 
observed variables may also be accounted for. (Chin, 1998)(Chin 1998) The characteristics and 
benefits of PLS-SEM are well explained by Hair et al. (Hair, Jr. et al., 2018)(Hair, Jr. et al. 2018) 
One drawback is the lack of a global goodness-of-fit measure. Henseler and Sarstedt introduced 
the standardized root mean square residual, SRMR, which is used here to measure goodness of 
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fit. (Henseler and Sarstedt, 2013)(Henseler and Sarstedt 2013) The consistency of parameter 
estimates is another issue that needs to be accounted for. Parameter accuracy is however viable, 
when measurement models meet certain standards, i.e. having four or more indicators with 
indicator loadings of ≥0.7. (Astrachan, Patel and Wanzenried, 2014)(Astrachan, Patel, and 
Wanzenried 2014) These standards must be taken into account to ensure parameter accuracy.
Social-desirability bias and the cCompliance iIndex
Self-reported compliance attitudes and compliance behaviour are likely to be influenced by 
social-desirability bias (SDB), leading to underreporting of noncompliance. (Brace, 2013, 
p.210)(Brace 2013, 210) Asked for their perceptions on compliance, 95.3% of participants 
reported that the phrase ‘My company would not do anything that is against the law’ was 
‘absolutely true’. Research on SDB shows that simply asking participants for honesty is to little 
avail to overcome the bias. (Phillips and Clancy, 1972) Techniques used in this survey are the 
omission of a respondent identifier, assurances of confidentiality, anonymous data collection 
via on online survey tool, and indirect questioning. In a review of prior studies Fisher found 
that indirect questioning reduced SDB on variables subject to social influence and that subjects 
effectively projected their beliefs and evaluations to indirect response situations. (Fisher, 
1993)(Fisher 1993) Brace presents indirect questioning as a viable method to overcome SDB, 
but highlights the danger that the researcher may not be sure about the percentage of participants 
who projected their own behaviour onto others and participants who honestly reported their 
judgement of others. (Brace, 2013, p.217)(Brace 2013, 217) Being aware of this danger, indirect 
questioning was used to determine levels of compliance and build a compliance index as shown 
in graph 7. As overall compliance levels were estimated to be quite high by experts at the 
interview stage, compliance levels asked for in the questionnaires ranged from “less than 70%” 
to “more than 95%”. Projecting the indirect data onto the companies themselves, a compliance 
index was calculated for each company. It is important to notice that the underlying scale is not 
equidistant. An equidistant 5-point-Likert-scale would have yielded much less information, as 
the researcher already knew from expert interviews, what the relevant compliance categories 
were likely to be. All other Likert scales in the study are equidistant. The histogram shows a 
distribution with n=36 (as many participants refrained from answering questions on compliance 
altogether), a mean of 4.04 (signifying overall estimated compliance levels around 95%, which 
is well in line with estimates from prior studies and expert interviews), a standard deviation of 
1.144, and a non-normal distribution with a negative skew. It becomes apparent, that although 
the vast majority of companies in the sample exhibit very high levels of compliance, a small 
group of outliers can be found at the left-hand side of the graph indicating low levels of 
compliance. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.791, indicating internal consistency of the scale. 
Graph 7. Compliance index calculation (Authors)
Results
Compliance rates
Graph 8 (n=37) shows the compliance rate by type of pollution as developed from questionnaire 
data. It becomes apparent that for some types of pollution compliance levels are estimated to 
be higher than for other types of pollution. While compliance with legislation on oil pollution, 
the prohibition of TBT for hull-coatings and legislation on waste pollution are deemed to be 
complied with by more than 95% of companies on average, a significant number of participants 
estimate the compliance with sulphur legislation to be around 91-95%, while most estimate 
compliance rates to exceed 95% as well. Compliance with sewage water legislation exhibits a 
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different pattern than all other initiatives, as it will only enter into force in 2019 and serves as a 
control variable here. Interestingly, a small number of companies accounting for some 10-15% 
of the sample estimate compliance rates for all mandatory measures to be below 70%. These 
companies are likely to be noncompliant themselves at least occasionally, following the theory 
of indirect questioning. This noncompliance rate seems to be in line with the 5-15% estimated 
by experts at the interview stage.
Graph 8. Compliance rate by type of pollution (Authors)
Compliance drivers
PLS-SEM was conducted as described above with results shown in graph 9 below. Histograms 
of constructs show approximately bell-shaped symmetric curves. While PLS-SEM does not 
assume a certain data distribution, it is important to assure that data distribution is not extremely 
non-normal, as that would lead to difficulties in assessment of parameter weights. Skewness 
and curtosis were used here to assess how data deviates from normality with a value lower than 
-1 or higher than +1 for both considered non-normal. The construct ‘Motivations’ is not 
normally distributed. The nonnormality of the construct stems from extremely non-normal 
distributions for indicators Ind_Morals1 and Ind_Morals2 as can be seen by their skewness and 
kurtosis. These indicators were thus eliminated from the set, leaving three indicators to explain 
the construct ‘Motivations’ with a healthy Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.771. Other indicators were 
not deleted, even if their outer loadings were slightly below 0.7, so as not to decrease content 
validity (Hair, Jr. et al., 2018, p.113)(Hair, Jr. et al., 2018, p.113), but the construct ‘Exterior 
determinants’ was split into the two concepts ‘Sanctions and Enforcement’ and ‘Human 
error/Higher forces’ to increase content validity. No indicator showed outer loadings below 0.3, 
as these had already been removed when considering Cronbach’s Alpha in preparing the data 
for analysis with PLS.
The R²-value of 0.441 shows that around 44.1% of variance in compliance behaviour 
may be explained by the exogenous latent variables. According to Ringle et al., this can be 
described as a moderate effect. (Ringle, Sinkovics and Henseler, 2009)(Ringle, Sinkovics and 
Henseler, 2009) Model fit is thus far from perfect but the model has moderate explanatory value. 
Not all path estimates are statistically significant. Path coefficients have standardized values 
between -1 and +1. Any value close to 0 shows a weak relationship that is usually not 
statistically significant. As in indication it can be assumed that values above 0.2 are significant, 
which only is the case for the concept ‘Organizational Capacities’ with a path value of 0.613 
and ‘Sanctions and Enforcement’ with a path value of 0.209. T-values and p-values determined 
through bootstrapping are shown in the table below graph 9. With a p-value below 0.01, 
organizational capacities were significant at the 1% level, while sanctions and enforcement 
could not be shown to be statistically relevant. As can be seen from the outer loadings below, 
particularly the indicators Ind_Time and Ind_Network have high loading factors on the concept 
‘Organizational Capacities’, indicating that a lack of time and a lack of a network with other 
companies might be significantly related to a lower level of compliance with environmental 
legislation. The remaining two concepts determined from expert interviews and literature 
review could not be found to show a statistically significant relation with compliance rates. 
Instead, other drivers must explain deviations in compliance levels. Similar to other latent 
constructs, no significant relation could be found between control variables and compliance.
No universal measure for model fit is known for PLS. Root mean square residual 
covariance (SRMR) is used as one measure of model fit here. The model has an SRMR-value 
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of 0.127. A value of 0 generally indicates perfect fit, while a value below 0.08 indicates good 
fit when applied to CB-SEM models. Hair et al. argue however that this threshold is too low 
for PLS-SEM and propose applying a higher (though unspecified) threshold. (Hair, Jr. et al., 
2018, p.193)(Hair, Jr. et al., 2018, p.193) SRMR does not indicate very good model fit. RMStheta 
is considered as a second measure of model fit with a value above 0.12 indicating a lack of fit. 
The value calculated in Smart PLS for the model at hand is RMStheta=0.246. This second 
measure indicates poor model fit. Further analysis and changes in model specification seem 
thus necessary.
Graph 9. Results of partial least squares analysis (Authors)
Reliability analysis
Measures of construct reliability are shown in the table below. As in this study new 
measures for concepts are developed, a Cronbach’s Alpha of close to 0.6 is deemed acceptable, 
in accordance with assessments by Nunnally (Nunnally, 1978)(Nunnally, 1978) and Hair. (Hair, 
Jr. et al., 2018, p.24)(Hair, Jr. et al., 2018, p.24) With well-defined constructs, a minimum of 0.7 
is demanded to describe reliability. Composite reliability tends to overestimate reliability 
slightly, while Cronbach’s Alpha might underestimate reliability for the type of study at hand, 
involving Likert scales with few points. Hair et al estimate that true reliability estimates lie 
somewhere between these indicators. (Hair, Jr. et al., 2018)(Hair, Jr. et al., 2018) Following that 
argument, concepts are shown to be reliable with composite reliability above 0.7 for all concepts 
and Cronbach’s Alpha above or close to 0.6 for all concepts. These measures are comparable 
to other exploratory studies. 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha
Rho_A Composite 
Reliability
Average 
Variance
Area of operations 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Average vessel age 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Company size 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Compliance 0.795 0.803 0.865 0.617
Human error/Higher 
forces
0.639 2.865 0.781 0.657
Motivations 0.779 0.943 0.863 0.681
Organizational 
capacities
0.595 0.692 0.748 0.399
Sanctions and 
enforcement
0.589 0.596 0.829 0.708
Type of operations 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 2. Measures of construct reliability (Authors)
Main findings, limitations and further research 
Study results show that organizational capacities of a shipping company, particularly 
available time to collect and apprehend legal information, a strong network with other 
companies, and membership in an industry association, are statistically significant and 
positively correlated with increased levels of compliance with maritime environmental 
legislation. All other constructs that were developed from expert interviews and prior studies 
could not be found to have statistically significant effects. These results are particularly striking 
in the case of controls and enforcement, which is traditionally seen as the main driver of 
compliance in economic theory. This driver, despite a significant loading factor on compliance, 
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did not withstand statistical scrutiny of empirical data. The main research outcome is that 
companies with more resources at hand fare better in complying with environmental rules than 
companies with less available resources. These findings are however not statistically linked to 
company size, signifying that both larger and smaller shipping enterprises may be endowed 
with the necessary resources to make for a law-abiding market player. It seems that legal 
compliance is something that a company must be able to afford and that a player may 
consciously invest in by investing in personnel specifically tasked with following legal 
developments and building up relations with other companies to exchange information on new 
rules. Also, paying for industry association membership and making use of both information 
and relations will be strongly correlated with environmental compliance. 
The rather poor overall model fit may be explained by a lack of correlation between 
compliance and compliance drivers identified, but may also be an effect of measurement errors, 
errors in translating the latent concepts into viable proxy variables or may be a result of the 
small sample size. Also, instrumentation of the questionnaire to receive a desired outcome is 
possible, where partic pants overestimate compliance costs and underestimate noncompliant 
behaviour to discourage further political involvement in the industry. The results are not 
atypical for exploratory studies, where tentative first steps are made to identify relationships 
between abstract concepts and much still needs to be learned in terms of describing and 
measuring the latent concepts. Also, the research shows the benefits of conducting mixed 
methods research. The theoretical concept presented above represent a convincing outcome of 
thorough qualitative research but does not seem to withstand statistical scrutiny. 
Next steps would be the further development of indicators to describe latent variables 
and a further search for explanatory factors of compliance that are not represented in the 
theoretical framework so far. Also, statistical analysis based on a larger sample size would be 
valuable to improve the analysis of compliance drivers and to further the understanding of 
regulatory compliance as a measure to improve environmental legislation.
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Graph 1: Development of costs 
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Graph 2: Ranking by most expensive legal measure 
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Graph 3: Ranking by most expensive legal measure (2018-2022) 
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Graph 4: Ranking of factors by influence on freight rates 
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Graph 5: Theoretical framework 
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Graph 6: Path model 
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Graph 7: Compliance index calculation 
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Graph 8: Estimated compliance 
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Graph 9: PLS analysis and bootstrapping 
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